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been   occulted   by   official   history­telling;   it   is   also 
"lost" in that its memory has been abandoned even by 
many   who   lived   through   it;   "lost"   also   in   the 
embarrassed silence of those who prefer to foreground 
the   subsequent   economic  miracle  of   the  1990s   that 
gave rise to today's more prosperous China; and "lost" 









ideology  and values   that  had  dominated   the   life  of 
China's political and intellectual elite for much of the 
twentieth   century   continued   to   exercise   their 
influence. In the immediate post­Mao era, even those 
disabused   with   Communist   ideology   were   still   in 
thrall of its logic and mechanisms; embedded in the 
contestatory   discourse   and   actions   of   the   dissident 
intelligentsia   was   an   ideal,   utopian   notion   of 
communism. In other words, young dissident former 
Red  Guards  were   disappointed   and   chagrined,   and 
passionately   so,   by   the   betrayal   of   the   ideals   of 
egalitarianism, liberation and total revolution that had 
so   convinced   them   at   the   start   of   the   Cultural 
Revolution in the mid­1960s, and even before that.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Beyond Communist   ideology,  but  also central   to   it, 
was   the   legacy   of   an   intellectual   revolutionary 
discourse that had its beginnings in the mid­ to late 
nineteenth century burgeoning nationalist   frustration 
with the  regnant dynasty's   impotence in  the face of 
Western   and   Japanese   military   superiority.   This 
patriotic,   anti­imperialist   discourse   demanded   that 
educated youth consecrate   their  ambitions  and  their 
abilities   to   serving   China.   'China'   was   at   first 
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understood   as   a   post­traditional   state   defined   and 
coalesced into a fictional oneness in reaction to the 
aggression   of   numerous   foreign   powers.     But   the 
proto­nationalist origins of this modern response were 
to   be   found   in   a   centuries­long   hostility   to   the 
"foreign", Qing dynasty ruling Manchu house, which 
paradoxically could not have ruled unless thoroughly 
integrated   into,   and   supported   by   a   centuries­old 
Chinese   bureaucratic   institutions   and   elite   cultural 
universe.
After   the   First  World  War  (1914­1918),   the   1919 
Versailles   peace   process  from  which   the   fledgling 
republic   emerged   badly   treated   ­­   and  more   like   a 
vanquished power than the ally China in fact had been 
to   Britain,   France,   the  USA   and   Japan   ­­   China's 
intellectual   class   adopted   a   logic   common   to 
numerous other Asian and African countries seeking 
sovereignty:   a   logic   that   dictated   the   attainment   of 
independence   and   sovereignty   by   a  mandatory   and 
unavoidable emulation of the modernized nation­state 
model   to   which   there   was   deemed   to   exist   no 
alternative.   While   Europe's   Asian   and   African 
colonies   had   been   denied   sovereignty   by   President 
Wilson's   peace   congress,   the   principle   of   national 
self­determination and the notion of the nation­state 
as the basic framework and sine qua non of modernity 
had  been  reaffirmed and  consolidated  by  Woodrow 





dramatically   illustrated   by   the   4  May   1919  student 
demonstrators who protested against the outcome of 
the   treaty   talks   by   marching   across   Tiananmen 
Square.  The protests  evolved  into renewed demands 
for Western­style  scientific  and political  methods  to 
be adopted. As such what became known as the 'May 










the   1960s   Red   Guards,   and   the   post­Cultural 
Revolution  intelligentsia they became, can be traced 
back to that model.
This   culturalist   view  of  China's   twentieth­century 
does not seek to challenge the centrality of political 
economic   questions   in   China's   recent   history,   but 
rather   foregrounds   the   fact   that   in   the   process   of 
building and consolidating a nation so much depends 
on   cultural   and   ideological   construction   that   the 
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importance   of,   what   Marx  had   termed,   the 
"superstructure"   of   culture   and   other   non­material 
institutions has been just as important as the economic 
base.   In   so   saying,   there   is   no   intention   here   of 
defending   Mao   Zedong's   and   Mao's   followers' 
attempts to make ideology and culture supreme. My 
desire is rather to illustrate the power of ideology to 
motivate   China's   intelligentsia   and   the   historical 
importance   of   this   culturalist   perspective   in   its 
intellectual imaginary.  
While   this   book   has   the   serious   objective   of 
attempting   to   present   the,   at   once,   parallel   yet 
intermeshed  moments,   evolutions,   events,   practices 
and objects of a period that runs from the late 1970s 
to the beginning of the 1990s, there is no pretence that 
this   account   is   either   exhaustive   or   comprehensive. 
This is simply, yet ambitiously, an attempt to "make 
sense" of a period of time in a "post­historical" world, 
or   rather   in   a   present   moment   marked   by   an 
abandonment of historicity as a public and intellectual 
priority. 
In   China,   this   non­historicity   is   pushed   to   the 















telling   becomes   possible,   of   this   moment   I   have 
named   the   Lost   Decade,   it   will   have   achieved   its 
purpose.















the   1980s,   it   can   also   give   rise   to   a   tendency   to 
1 P. 209.
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emphasize   what   was   familiar   to   me,   located   in 
Beijing, at the expense of what was happening beyond 
the capital.  Nevertheless,  given  the absence and the 
impossibility of having access to many of the means 
normally   available   to   cultural   historians,   a   partial 





political   authority   was   based   in   Beijing,   and 
contestation   and   opposition   (despite   a   history   of 
regional   intellectual   opposition)   was,   similarly, 
Beijing­focussed.  




childhood,   in   half­understood   snatches   of 
conversation   about   events   in  China,   in   folk   stories 
imbibed whilst   sat  on a  grand­father's  knees.    Mao 
Zedong (pronounced and heard as Mao Jek­tung) and 
Chiang Kai­shek, were familiar  to me long before I 






and   its   satellite   communities   that   remain  vivid   and 
lush and almost tangible in my mind, what most left 
its trace was the old man's sustained and passionate 
interest  for what was happening  in China.  For even 
after a half­century of continuous separation from his 
homeland, he remained doggedly attached to the land 



















The   beginning   of   the   post­Mao   era   saw   the 
consolidation   and  maintenance   of  Deng  Xiaoping's 






several   comebacks   after   having   been   labelled   a 
rightist   and   "capitalist   roader"   during   the   Cultural 
Revolution  retrospectively  demarcated  as   the  period 
between 1966 and 1976. Many of the measures that 
Deng instituted after 1977 had already been proposed 








the   intellectual,   and  what  was  more  was  habitually 
portrayed as the only man capable of tempering Mao's 
excesses.   In   hindsight,   such   an   assessment   is 











succeeded   in   bringing   back   into   government   non­
radicals   such   as   Deng  Xiaoping.   The   popular 
perception of Zhou Enlai, his place in the urban elite's 
imaginary,   his   usefulness   as   a   figurehead   of 
moderation,   led   to  mass  mourning  during   the  1976 
Qingming  Festival   on   which   day   the   dead   are 
habitually   remembered   and   honoured.   In   1976, 
Qingming   fell   on  5  April.    As   the  police   removed 
wreaths   that   had   been   laid   around   the   Martyrs' 





The   demonstrators   were   brutally   suppressed   and 
denounced   as   counter­revolutionaries.   The   event 
became   known   as   the  Tiananmen   Incident.    Many 
were killed. There exist no statistics; no images of the 
repression  are  available.   It  was   recounted   that  Mao 
was   persuaded   by   his   closest   advisors,  who  would 
become   known   as   the   'Gang   of   Four,'   that   this 
manifestation   of   respect   for   Zhou   was   in   fact   an 
incipient   and   dangerous   counter­revolutionary 
movement.  Deng  Xiaoping  was suspected of having 









advised   that   the   students   and   their   supporters 
presented   a   counter­revolutionary   threat,   and   were 
intent on toppling both him and the Communist Party 
apparatus.     But   as   we   shall   see   throughout   this 
account   of   the   Lost   Decade,   and   contrary   to   the 
clement   view   of   Deng   that   is   often   presented   in 
Western   and  Chinese   accounts  of   the  man   and  his 
action,   Deng   Xiaoping   was   capable   of   acting 
decisively   and harshly  with  or  without   'advice.'    A 
scenario presenting the two Tiananmen "incidents", as 
two "neat" opening and closing scenes would be too 
facile  and  would   tend   to  elide   the  major  historical, 
political,   diplomatic,   economic   and   technological 
changes, that took place between 1976 and 1989; there 
were no satellite transmissions, and no CNN, indeed 
no external   mass media presence at  all  at   the first 
Tiananmen Incident.
Chairman Mao Zedong  died on 9 September 1976, 
and   on   6   October   Mao's   chosen   successor   Hua 
Guofeng  华 国 锋 ,   emboldened   by   his   advisors, 
arrested Mao's widow, Jiang Qing 江青,  and three of 
Mao's   courtiers:   Wang   Hongwen  王 洪 文 ,   Yao 
Wenyuan姚文元, Zhang Chunqiao张春桥. While this 
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spectacular   coup   produced   the   desired   effect   of 
demonstrating   dramatically   the   end   of   the  Cultural 
Revolution, it  also re­entrenched the impression that 
the mistakes and crimes of a system could be blamed 
on a small,   tight  clique who had misled  the people 
and  the  Party.   Indeed,   the  objective  of   those  in   the 
higher echelons of the Party was to take control of the 
machine,   and  not   to  put   in  question   its   legitimacy. 
The "excesses" of the Cultural Revolution  would be 
officially   attributed   to   a   small   group   who   had 
manipulated  Mao,   and   to   a   lesser   extent   to  Mao 
himself. The responsibility of the Party would thus be 
limited, and its authority left unimpaired.
Deng  Xiaoping  who   was   the   motor   driving   the 
reform faction  of   the  Party,  had  been  one  of   those 

















The   visual   representation   of   Hua  was   also 
constructed so as   to  mimic,  and  thus  vicariously  to 
perpetuate the aura of, the former Chairman.  Thus in 




This   strategy,  of  adopting   the   spectacular   style  of 
governance   of   Mao   Zedong,   depended   on   a 
maintenance   of   populist   Maoist   iconography   and 
representation of power, but also on continuing with 
Maoist  policies  and  methods.  Mao's  basic   ideology 
and its authority could thus be kept intact while   the 
Gang of  Four  could be held   responsible   for  having 
distorted Mao's intentions in the past. 
Thus,   the   old   Cultural   Revolution  means   of 
impressing   and   persuading   the   people   and,   in 




promote  the model  industrial  collective,   the Daqing 
oil field and refinery complex.2   
Hua  Guofeng  also   continued   to   adhere   to   the 
unpopular Mao­Gang of Four line that the Tiananmen 
2 However, the mass campaign, first launched in 1964, exhorting 
the   peasants   to   emulate   the   agricultural   collective   and   the 
'leftist'  emblem that  was Dazhai  would be rapidly abandoned 
and replaced with a drive  to stimulate   individual  peasants   to 




incident   of   5   April   1976   had   been   a   counter­
revolutionary   movement.   In   terms   of   policy,   the 




Party   journal   Red   Flag:   whatever   decisions   and 
whatever   directives   Mao   had   instituted   would   be 
firmly maintained.  The policy, which became known 
as the "two whatevers"  两个凡是 , soon came under 
attack from Deng's  faction.    In May, Deng let  it  be 
known  that  he  considered   this   "whateverism"  to  be 
un­Marxist.  The pressure on Hua, and the others who 
owed their careers to Mao, became irresistible and at 
the  Third  Plenum of   the  Tenth  Central  Committee 
(16­21 July  1977)  of   the  Chinese  Communist  Party 
Deng  was   reinstated   in   his   previously   positions   of 
power.  
Over   the   summer   months   Deng  pushed   for   the 
education   system   to   be   restored   to   its   pre­Cultural 
Revolution  normalcy   and   university   entrance 
examinations resumed in October 1977, thus sounding 
the   death­knell   of   the   Maoist   policy   of   positive 
discrimination   in   favour   of   workers,   peasants   and 
soldiers.  Needless to say, the new policy was warmly 
received   by   the   intellectual   classes   whom   Deng 
needed to win over.
In   the   autumn,   the  State  Science   and  Technology 
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Commission,   and   a   national   research   institute,   the 
Chinese   Academy   of   Social   Sciences,   were 
established.   Academics   and   intellectuals   were   thus 
reinstated into a position of relative privilege.
We   therefore   can   trace   the   beginning   of   major 
institutional reforms to the end of 1977.  Deng's return 




been  before   the  Cultural  Revolution,   gathered  pace 
with   the   beginning  of   the   reinstatement   of   toppled 






From   a   "counter­revolutionary"   incident   it   was 
transformed   into   a   "revolutionary   movement."   In 









大字报 intensified,   and  Deng  Xiaoping  voiced  his 
support for the Democracy Wall movement. However, 
in terms both of textual production (inscribed on the 
Democracy   Wall   posters   and   published   in   the 
Democracy   journals)   and   of   dissident   protest,   to 
maintain   that   1978­1979   was   an   unrehearsed   and 
unprecedented moment of feverish activity following 
the sterility of the Cultural Revolution, would be to 
perpetuate an erroneous vision of  the  reality  of  the 
1970s.
That   "unofficial"   political   and   cultural   activities 
were suddenly allowed more freedom and even, for a 
time,   encouraged,   is   undeniable.   To   bolster   the 
position that ideas, words, and actions spontaneously 
erupted  in  a  new atmosphere  of  post­Mao euphoria 
would be to subscribe to an official or quasi­official 
representation   of   facts   and   events.3  The   Li­Yi­Zhe 
3 As Phil Williams noted in a post­1989 reflection on the dissent 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s, not only did there pervade a 
dominant   impression   reinforced   by   Western   media 
representation of the 1989 events, that all political dissent and 
activity was concentrated in Beijing, what he calls "the capital 




Williams,   "Some   Provincial   Precursors   of   Popular   Dissent 










and Huang Xizhe.  The  text  criticized  the  campaign 
against   Lin  Biao  林彪 ,  Mao's   former   second­in­
command and chosen successor, who was denounced 
for   conspiracy   and   the   excesses   of   the   Cultural 




function,   and   which   Li­Yi­zhe  condemned   as   a 
"social­fascist dictatorship."  The authors claimed that 
the early phase of the Cultural Revolution  had been 
positive  and revolutionary,   in  particular   in   terms of 
the   freedom   of   movement,   expression   and   of 
association  it  permitted  and even encouraged.    But, 
the authors maintained,  all  of  these positive aspects 









this  historic  document...instead  of   focussing  on   the 






unofficial   public   commemoration   ceremonies   were 
held   in   the   major   provincial   cities   of   Taiyuan, 
Wuchang,  Wuhan   and   Hangzhou   from  mid­March 
1976   onwards.5  Just   as   the   political   posters   and 





Most   of   the   so­called  Misty  Poets,   including  Bei 
Dao北岛 , Mang Ke芒克 , Gu Cheng顾成 , and the 
then less well­known Duo Duo多多, had been writing 
'unofficial'  poetry   inspired  by  a  modernist   aesthetic 
4 Carol Appleyard and Patrick Goode (trans), London: Allison 
and Busby, 1977. (“'But the emperor has no clothes!” shouted 
the   child...”   Hans­Christian   Andersen,  The   Emperor's   New 
Clothes.


















But   late   1978   was   not   only   noteworthy   for   the 
appearance  of   samizdat  publications.  The  month  of 
December   constituted,   if   not   a   democratic   festival 
then at least, a sort of political holiday during which 
constraints   were   relaxed.   This   may   have   been 
connected   to   the  major   foreign  policy   event  of   the 
post­Mao   era,   for   December   saw   not   only   the 
founding of democracy journals or  minkan民刊 , but 
also the announcement of the imminent normalization 
of   diplomatic   relations   between   the   PRC   and   the 
USA. 
The   Third   Plenum   of   the   Eleventh   Central 
Committee   brought  Deng's   supporters   and  protégés 
28




1978,   then,   can   also   be   seen   as   a   key  moment   of 
change. 
In   the   strictly   political   domain,   however,   it   was 
during   1979   that   Deng's   power   was   consolidated 
within the Party, and the limits of the Party's tolerance 
of   dissident   political   views   were   fixed   and 
demonstrated  with   the   arrest   of   numerous   activists 
and the suppression of Democracy Wall.
By the end of 1979, Deng had become hegemonic, 
the   Party's   authority   had   been   reaffirmed   and   the 
theory and practices of the Cultural Revolution were 
officially   renounced and denounced.  Pro­democratic 
dissident   sentiment   had   been   encouraged   and   then 
contained,  and,  by  and   large  most   intellectuals   and 
writers with the exception of the unofficial, dissident 
ex­Red Guard cultural  and  intellectual activists,  had 
been   convinced  of   the   sincerity   of  Deng's   and   the 
Party's new found benevolence towards them. To sum 
up,  while  during 1977 and 1978  the   foundations  of 
Deng's rise to supremacy had been laid, it was only 
during 1979 that the tone for the next ten years was 
set.   The   contradictions,   the   uncertainties,   and   the 
intermittent political campaigns in the socio­cultural 
domain   would   continue   against   a   backdrop   of 
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economic   reforms   until   the   economic   and   political 
discontent of 1988 and 1989 came to a head. 
Let our Lost Decade  start, then, with the optimism 
and  activism  that   can  be   traced  back   to  December 




seem inevitably  to  be   its   terminus.    Yet,   from both 






southern   China   and   reinvigorate   and   relaunch   his 
economic   reforms   with   his   now   mythologized 
“southern tour” or nanfang zhi xing 南方之行.  
But between 1989 and 1992, China, and especially 











military   strength   to   maintain   itself,   was   the 
accumulation of wealth, or economic empowerment. 




favoured;   in   the   cities   and   along  China's   coastline. 
With   political   participation   now   closed   off   to 
intellectuals   and   masses   alike,   the   line   of   least 
resistance was to acquiesce in the Party­induced, but 
progressively   self­generated,   collective   amnesia 
concerning the events of 1989. Indeed, eventually  the 
whole   1970s­1980s   pre­consumerist,   politicized 
period   would   be   bracketed   off   in   the   popular 
consciousness.     Thus,   official   ideology   once   again 
would succeed in dominating the collective vision of 




been  a   characteristic  of   the  Lost  Decade.   It  was   a 
decade   marked   also   by   intellectual,   cultural   and 
political   negotiation   between   the   Party   on   the   one 
hand   and   civil   forces   represented   by   students,   and 





many   intellectuals,   and   encouraged   by   reformers 
within   the   Party.   Their   credo,   which   became 
hegemonic, was fed in large part by the old Cold War 
illusion   that   economic   reforms   leading   to   the 
installation   of   capitalism   would   inevitably   and 














Xiaoping's   loyalty   to men he had put   in  place,  and 
maybe some simply saw no alternative but to make 
6  The participation in the global  capitalist  economy of former 
state­controlled   socio­economies   has   not   significantly 















regeneration   of   post­War  Germany   –   and   again   in 
"The Retreat from the Word" described the harm that 
had   been   done   to   the  German   language   under   the 
Nazis; the harm being the use that "political bestiality 
and falsehood can make of a language when the latter 
has...become   ossified   with   clichés,   unexamined 
definitions, and left­over words."  
A   decade   later,   in   1968,   Steiner   pointed   to   the 
renewed damage being done to the German language 
under   the   Socialist   regime   in   East   Germany.7  In 




practice  of,   language by a  centralized,  nationalized, 
political authority, what language in China underwent 
after 1949 resembled both these German moments. 
The  post­Mao  period  addressed   in   this  book   is   a 
brief period of time, a short breathing space after the 
ossification   of   clichés   that   characterized   official 
linguistic   practice   during   the   Cultural   Revolution. 
During that hiatus, which, we should recall, was not a 
time of uninterrupted and widespread free expression, 
it  was   indeed   possible   to   attenuate   the   ideological 




past   into   a   Communist­nationalist   ideological   fairy 
story, and once more turned reality on its head. Even 
now in post­Olympic China, with bookshops full  of 
translated   Western   academic   works   and   China's 
physical, if not its electronic, frontiers as open as they 
ever   have   been,   history   cannot   be   told,   nor   even 
attempted to be told in China, by Chinese, in Chinese. 
But the "breathing space" was succeeded not only by 











and   precision."8  And   almost   fifty   years   after   those 
words   were   written,   the   discourses   of   media,   the 








socio­cultural   critique   than   the   one   in   which   we 
currently   live,   describe  well   the   language   of   post­
Deng China: 
What save half­truths, gross simplifications or 
trivia   can,   in   fact   be   communicated   to   that 
semi­literate  mass   audience  which   consumer 
society  has  summoned  into  the  marketplace? 
Only   in   a   diminished  or   corrupted   language 
can   most   such   communication   be   made 
effective.9 




hindsight:   What   else   save   half­truths,   gross 





the  times it  seeks to describe and explain.    For  the 
author   of   this   book   the   temporal   and   intellectual 
boundaries   of   this   Lost   Decade  were   necessarily 
determined by a personal, lived experience of China 
during those years, years embraced by two particular 
milestones   that   left   deep   impressions  –   the   first   in 
1979, the second in 1990. I first set foot in China on 
30 August 1979. I had flown to Hong Kong the day of 
the   assassination   of   the  Queen   of   England's   uncle 
Lord   Mountbatten,   news   of   which   had   been 
announced over the  British Airways aircraft's  sound 
system by   a   very  moved   and  matronly   chief   flight 
attendant. After thirty­six hours, in the then still very 












with  my  witnessing   the   last   weeks   of   the   Peking 
Spring  and of Democracy Wall, a myriad of posters 
that  both  concretized  and symbolized  a  moment  of 
relatively   free   political   expression   that   had   been 
manipulated   with   a   Machiavellian   agility   by   the 
bridge­playing   Deng  Xiaoping.  Symbolically,   that 
decade ended for me in May 1990, when I returned to 
the   scene   of   the   debacle   of   the   1989   democracy 
movement. As an undergraduate at London's School 
of   Oriental   and  African   Studies  my   four   years   of 
somewhat privileged and elitist training had focused 
equally on modern and pre­modern Chinese studies. I 
had  been  one  of  only   two students   to   specialize   in 
poetry  both  "classical"  and  modern.  Now,   just   as   I 
arrived in Beijing, several of those pioneering modern 
writers   had   been   released   from   their   seclusion, 
exclusion and exile which had lasted in some cases for 
twenty years. 
The   Cultural   Revolution  was   officially   being 
described as an irredeemably black moment in recent 
China's history, but it was also one that dissident Wei 
Jingsheng,   following   the   Li   Yizhe  analysis,  would 
proclaim a hijacked people's  revolution.  It  had been 














censorship   and   intolerance   which   would   descend 
repeatedly through the 1980s each time recalling the 








power,   around   1968,   the   unruly   yet   faithful   urban 
youngsters upon whom he had called to overturn the 
bureaucratic   order   were   dispatched   to   far­flung 












rode  in a friend's  car – still  a  rare possession for a 


































the  River  Elegy  documentary,   left  China   for  Hong 
Kong just  before  the  events  of   the spring 1989.  He 
was accused by the Chinese government after 4 June 
of   being   one   of   the   "black   hands"   responsible   for 





documentary   River   Elegy,   had   sensed   that   the 
repression  was   imminent   in  mid­May   and   left   the 





expelled   from   the   Chinese   Communist   Party   and 
targeted   by   the   Campaign   Against   Bourgeois 
Liberalization, was in the USA during the spring of 
11 As reported by the international writers organisation, PEN,  in 





1989,  and would see  out  his  days  there;  he died  in 
exile in 2007. 
Duoduo,   after   the   immediate   Western   media 












support   of  the  students   at   Tiananmen   Square,  was 
barred from performing in public. He offered to do a 
series of nationwide concerts in 1990 and to donate 
the  proceeds   to  the  funding of  Asian Games which 
were due to take place in Beijing in 1990, and which 
were  now seriously  financially  compromised by  the 
international   repugnance   towards   the   Chinese 
authorities   in   the  wake of  4  June.  Cui  Jian's   initial 





























having   to   come   to   terms  with   the   post­Tiananmen 
situation. 
The ambition of the gathering in Stockholm in the 






Bei   Dao  had   left   China   for   a   conference   in   the 
United   States   on   23  April   1989.  After   4   June   his 
presence in China was declared undesirable; he was 
constrained to live abroad.  Chen Maiping, who was 
already   resident   in   Scandinavia   organized   the 
practicalities of the rebirth of Today.
Chen Maiping, Stockholm, May 1990
The   young  writer  Xu  Xing  was   relieved   to   have 
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found   a   safe   haven   yet   seemed   traumatized   by   his 
escape  from China,  while    Liu Suola  spoke of  and 
sang her passion, for music. Yang Lian the poet, and 
Li  Tuo,   the   literary   editor   and  critic,   drank  coffee, 
dissected   the   past   and   planned   the   future.   Gao 
Xingjian  had  come   from Paris   to  associate  himself 
with the Today project.
The   meeting   in   Stockholm   was   an   emotionally­
charged occasion where old friendships were renewed, 
new   alliances   forged,   and   where   post­Tiananmen 
analyses,   afterthoughts   and   recriminations   were 
aired.13 
The writers' meeting in Stockholm concluded with 
everyone  agreeing   to   relaunch   the  Today  magazine, 
and all present continued with their exile existence for 
extended stretches of time. 
The  May  1990  Today  meeting   also   served  as   the 























The   questions  I  put   to   Gao   Xingjian   did   not 




patriotism   and   its   instrumentalization   of   creative 
practices,   Gao   had   already   taken   up   residence   in 
Europe   in  1987,   the  year  of   the  Campaign  Against 
Bourgeois Liberalization....
On   12  May   1990,   having   heard   the   news   I   had 
brought from Beijing that all attempts to get an exit 
visa   for   his   wife   and   child   had   failed,   Bei   Dao 
nevertheless dutifully declaimed his Chinese poetry to 
an  attentive  Swedish  public   for  whom  it  had  never 
been intended.   Listening to Bei Dao's poetry in this 
Nordic city so distant  in space   and spirit  from the 
Beijing    of   the  1980s,   it  was   for  me  a  moment  of 







































* Bei   Dao,   "Requiem   ­   for   the   victims   of   June   Fourth," 





without   incident   on   mainland   China.   Security,   as 
might be expected, had been reinforced for some time 
and especially so in May and June. Fang Lizhi and his 
wife  were   still   living   inside   the  American  embassy 
compound. And then after a year's negotiations, on 25 
June   the  Chinese   authorities   announced   in   a   face­
saving   statement   that   given   Fang's   willingness   to 
"repent" and in view of the couple's state of health it 





China's  supreme leader was rid of his  most  loathed 
enemy, and a chapter in China's modern history came 
to an end. 
The   story   of   the   succeeding  decades   is   that   of   a 























Fool's   Day   1994.   In   November   1995   he   was 
condemned   again,   this   time   for   "attempting   to 
overthrow the government," and given a fourteen­year 




On 8  October  1990 China's   first  MacDonald's   fast­
food restaurant opened in the Special Economic Zone 
of Shenzhen.15  In the spring of 1992 Deng Xiaoping 





embarked  on  his   "Southern   tour"  of  China  visiting 
Guangzhou,   Shenzhen,   Zhuhai,   and   Shanghai   to 
support   and     relaunch  his   faltered  market   capitalist 
reforms.   By   the   end   of   the   1990s,   the   nascent 
materialism of the 1980s had entirely engulfed China's 
urban   population,   a   new   bourgeoisie   had   emerged, 






much of  the post­1989 world,  still  not come,  Mao's 
portrait   still   hangs   over   Tiananmen,   and   the 
Communist Party reigns supreme.
But   the  Lost  Decade  happened,   as   did   its   tragic 
conclusion in June 1989. Despite the official policy of 
"Forgetting  History"  witnesses   still   abound.  One  of 
them,   who   stood   behind   Zhao   Ziyang  during   his 
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